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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial regulators, rating agencies and many commentators have blamed weak Risk Culture 
for many of the large losses and financial company failures of the past decade.  But their 
exposition regarding a strong Risk Culture only goes as far as describing a few of the risk 
management practices of an organization and falls far short of describing the beliefs and 
motivations that are at the heart of any culture.  This discussion will present thinking about 
how the fundamental beliefs of Neo Classical Economics clash with the recommended risk 
practices and how the beliefs that underpin Enterprise Risk Management are fundamentally 
consistent with the recommended risk management practices but differ significantly from Neo 
Classical Economics beliefs.   
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Risk Culture has become the explanation of last resort for the choices and behaviors that 
fed the financial crisis of the last decade.   Because other explanations – economic, demographic, 
organizational and so on – proved inadequate, the conclusion seems to be that culture must have been 
the driver.  Hence the talk about the need for a “change of culture.” 
 
Weaknesses in risk culture are often considered a root cause of the global financial crisis, 
headline risk and compliance events. A financial institution’s risk culture plays an important 
role in influencing the actions and decisions taken by individuals within the institution and 
in shaping the institution’s attitude toward its stakeholders, including its supervisors.4 
Among regulators and quasi-regulators such as rating agencies that oversee the financial sector (and in 
particular the insurance industry), a consensus of sorts has formed about what change is needed in 
                                                                
1 David Ingram, CERA, FRM, PRM is Executive Vice President, Willis Re in New York.  He can be 
reached at dave.ingram@willis.com 
2 Alice Underwood, PhD, FCAS, CERA is Executive Vice President, Willis Re in New York. She can be 
reached at alice.underwood@willis.com 
3 Michael Thompson, PhD, is  a writer and senior research scholar affiliated with the risk and 
vulnerability programme at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in 
Laxenburg, Austria. He can be reached at michael.thompson@IIASA.ac.at.   
4 Financial Stability Board, Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk 
Culture: A Framework for Assessing Risk Culture (2014) 
culture.  This consensus emerges in the form of ten practices that firms are urged to adopt and 
regulators to look for to enhance their view of the viability of the risk management of a firm. 
 
Commonly Recommended Practices for Healthy Risk Culture5 
1 Risk Governance Involvement of the board in risk management 
2 Risk Appetite Clear statement of risk that the organization is willing to accept 
3 Compensation Incentive compensation does not conflict with goals of risk management 
4 Tone at the Top Board and top management are publicly vocal in support of risk management 
5 Accountability Individuals held accountable for violations of risk limits 
6 Challenge It is acceptable to publicly disagree with risk assessments 
7 Risk Organization 
Individuals assigned specific roles to facilitate the risk management program, including a lead 
risk officer 
8 
Communication and 
Participation 
Risk management is everyone’s job, and everyone knows what is happening 
9 
Link to Strategy and 
Planning 
Risk management program consistent with company strategy; planning considers risk 
information 
10 
Separate Measurement 
and Management of Risk 
No one assesses their own performance regarding risk and risk management 
 
This paper examines this approach to risk culture from a number of angles.  First, we review how those 
who study business organizations and other groups define “culture.”  In that light, we examine a widely 
adopted set of beliefs and motivations known as neoclassical economics – and contrast these with 
beliefs and motivations implicit in the ten recommended risk culture practices described above.  Next, 
we consider how “risk” can be meaningfully defined in this context, and draw out the implications for 
“Risk Culture.”  We conclude that adoption of the ten risk management practices will not change 
organizational risk culture, and propose alternative approaches that may be more meaningful and 
effective. 
 
What is Culture? 
According to anthropologists whose profession is to study how groups of people interact, definitions of 
the term “culture” fall into two classes:   
 
“One views culture as composed of values, beliefs, norms, rationalizations, symbols, 
ideologies, i.e. mental products.  The other sees culture as the total way of life of a people, 
their interpersonal relations as well as their attitudes.”6 
 
Neither definition would allow for an idea of culture that does not include the group’s underlying 
biases and motivations.   
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Business organizational theorist Edgar Shein says: 
 
Culture matters because it is a powerful, tacit, and often unconscious set of forces that 
determine both our individual and collective behavior, ways of perceiving, thought patterns, 
and values. Organizational culture in particular matters because cultural elements 
determine strategy, goals, and modes of operating7. 
 
He goes on to say that culture has three levels:  espoused values, artifacts and underlying assumptions.  
Espoused values are what we say about the official culture.  Artifacts are the observable actions of the 
organization.  But the underlying assumptions are ultimately the driver of culture, according to Shein.   
 
The essence of culture is then the jointly learned values and beliefs that work so well that 
they become taken for granted and non-negotiable.4   
 
Several studies of risk culture refer to the idea of “Potemkin villages” – structures created and activities 
carried out for the sake of appearances only, without underlying substance. 
 
The corporate governance of large banks was characterised by the creation of Potemkin 
villages to give the appearance of effective control and oversight, without the reality.8  
 
Recommending a set of Risk Culture practices without addressing underlying values and beliefs could 
well encourage the creation of ever larger and more ornate Potemkin villages, rather than meaningfully 
improving and enhancing Risk Culture. 
 
Underlying Beliefs in the Financial Sector   
Many people working the financial sector received an introduction to a commonly adopted set of 
beliefs during their first undergraduate course in economics.  A short list of such beliefs includes: 
 Rational expectations (Lucas) 
 Utility theory (Von Neumann–Morgenstern) 
 Shareholder value maximization (Friedman) 
 Efficient markets (Fama) 
 General equilibrium (Walras) 
 Law of one price (Arrow and Debreu) 
 
Business schools have a strong tendency to reinforce these beliefs, which are part of the canon of 
neoclassical economics.  Weintraub summarizes the three fundamental assumptions of neoclassical 
economics (NCE) as rational preferences, maximization of utility for individuals and profits for firms, 
and independent actions based on full and relevant information.9   
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This paradigm tends to dominate businesses in the financial sector, and has in general produced 
extremely favorable results for its adherents.  The exceptions, however, take the form of major 
disruptions to the economy.  Some observers have suggested that the 2007-2008 financial crisis is 
evidence of failure of these beliefs.    
 
As I see it, the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook 
beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.  Until the Great Depression, most 
economists clung to a vision of capitalism as a perfect or nearly perfect system.  That vision 
wasn’t sustainable in the face of mass unemployment, but as memories of the Depression 
faded, economists fell back in love with the old, idealized vision of an economy in which 
rational individuals interact in perfect markets, this time gussied up with fancy equations. 
The renewed romance with the idealized market was, to be sure, partly a response to shifting 
political winds, partly a response to financial incentives.10 
 
And yet these ideas are so entrenched in business schools and university economics departments that 
recent requests from students for exposure to any alternate theories of economics have been firmly 
rebuffed.11  Milton Friedman provided the ultimate defense against the incursion of disconfirming facts 
when he famously asserted that “a theory cannot be tested by comparing its assumptions directly 
with reality.”12 
 
The risk management practices of banks and insurers that were harmed by the events of 2007-2008 
are documented in many sources.13  Those practices include: 
 Focus on maximizing short-term profits 
 Reliance on the prevailing market impression of risk   
 Highly compliance-driven approach to risk management   
 High reliance on accounting standards for the assessment of the financial benefits of actions   
 Low communication of risk management information 
 Reliance on the market to validate any business strategy   
 Rewarding improvement in the company’s short-term results without regard to long-term 
implications 
 
Underlying Beliefs of Enterprise Risk Management 
What, then, are the beliefs that underlie the discipline of enterprise risk management (ERM)?  In 
comparison with the beliefs of neoclassical economics, there has not been much development of a 
formal theoretical framework for ERM.  There have been no Nobel prizes for advancement of ERM 
thinking, while at least half the economics prizes over the past 40 years have recognized advancements 
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in neoclassical economics.  However, the following ideas are implicit in most published ERM 
guidelines and best practices: 
 
 The world is dangerous enough that we are motivated to control risks, and also predictable 
enough that systematic management and exploitation of risk can be worthwhile 
 Preferences for risk and reward are asymmetrical: the aversion to a large potential loss is 
always higher than the preference for the same sized potential gain  
 Opportunities for profit via risk-taking exist because firms can find opportunities to exploit 
risks that the market has mispriced, and/or opportunities to exploit diversification effects  
 Organizations always prefer not to fail, so risk management objectives should be a part of all 
company strategies and should involve the company’s CEO and board or directors 
 Risks can and should be measured; this measurement is a technical exercise that requires 
expertise 
 Management of risk requires diligent attention to any choices to accept risks and actions to 
mitigate or transfer risk; more significant risk decisions should be approved at more senior 
levels of the company hierarchy 
 
ERM and NCE Beliefs and the Theory of Plural Rationality 
Comparison of these ERM beliefs with the NCE framework readily reveals conflicts.  Indeed, NCE does 
not suggest that companies should expend resource to manage risks; rather, investors can more 
efficiently manage the risks of their investments at a portfolio level.  Under NCE, failure of a firm is not 
intrinsically problematic: in fact, it is better for the system that firms fail so that their resources can be 
redeployed to other activities.  Because NCE investors diversify the intrinsic risks of individual 
investments across their portfolio, the costs of a few firm failures will in the end be much less than the 
cost of every firm performing risk mitigation to reduce their own individual likelihood of failure. 
 
Another conflict is seen in the NCE assumption that risk decisions are made based on expected values 
that weight risks only by size and probability.  But this conflicts with the idea of asymmetrical risk 
preferences.  ERM beliefs are more aligned in this area with the behavioral finance framework known 
as Prospect Theory, which posits that humans are not the rational beings assumed by NCE. 
 
Let’s compare ten recommended Risk Culture practices identified and encouraged by the Financial 
Stability Board, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, A.M. Best’s and Standard & Poor’s 
with the beliefs of ERM and NCE. 
  
 Table 1: Ten Risk Culture Principles Compared to ERM and NCE Principles 
 Risk Culture Practices ERM Principles NCE Principles14 
1 
Risk 
Governance 
Involvement of the board 
in risk management 
Firm survival should be the primary 
responsibility of the board; involvement in 
risk management supports that goal 
Board should represent shareholder 
interests, generally best served without 
the costs of risk management 
2 Risk Appetite 
Clear statement of risk 
that the organization is 
willing to accept 
Systematic management and exploitation 
of risk is worthwhile; preferences for risk 
and reward are asymmetrical 
Should be willing to accept any risk that 
will enhance shareholder value 
3 Compensation 
Incentive compensation 
does not conflict with 
goals of risk management 
Unwisely constructed incentives can 
encourage increased risk-taking without 
regard to firm’s survival or its 
asymmetrical risk/reward preferences   
Incentives should align interests of 
management as rational actors with those 
of the shareholders as rational actors, i.e. 
to increase value 
4 Tone at the Top 
Board and top 
management are publicly 
vocal in support of risk 
management 
Firm survival should be the primary 
responsibility of the board and 
management; involvement in risk 
management supports that goal 
Board  and management should 
represent shareholder interests, generally 
best served without the costs of risk 
management; leadership and employees 
will act rationally 
5 Accountability 
Individuals held 
accountable for violations 
of risk limits 
Need for diligent attention to risk; more 
significant risk decisions should be 
approved at more senior levels of the 
company hierarchy 
Should be willing to accept any risk that 
will enhance shareholder value; those 
closest to the market are best able to 
judge value 
6 Challenge 
It is acceptable to publicly 
disagree with risk 
assessments 
Discussion is healthy to ensure that the 
best risk measurements and ideas are 
applied by the best-qualified experts  
The market assesses risk and sets a 
price that incorporates all available 
information; no discussion is necessary 
7 
Risk 
Organization 
Individuals assigned 
specific roles to facilitate 
the risk management 
program, including a lead 
risk officer 
Need for diligent attention to risk; more 
significant risk decisions should be 
approved at more senior levels of the 
company hierarchy 
Risk management within the firm is not 
usually in the shareholder’s interests; how 
would these individuals and activities add 
to shareholder value?   
8 
Communication 
and 
Participation 
Risk management is 
everyone’s job, and 
everyone knows what is 
happening 
Making risk management everyone’s job 
is the best way to assure risk is properly 
controlled; transparency increases 
likelihood that risk management policies 
will be honored   
Risk management should be restricted to 
activities that clearly enhance shareholder 
value and those specifically required by 
regulators; communication should be on a 
“need to know” basis to avoid distracting 
productive employees 
9 
Link to Strategy 
and Planning 
Risk management 
program consistent with 
company strategy; 
planning considers risk 
information 
Supports the prevention of corporate 
failure 
Main corporate strategies and plans 
should focus on increasing shareholder 
value; therefore risk management should 
be restricted to activities that clearly 
enhance shareholder value and those 
specifically required by regulators 
10 
Separate 
Measurement 
and 
Management of 
Risk 
No one assesses their 
own performance 
regarding risk and risk 
management 
Risks can and should be measured; this 
measurement is a technical exercise that 
requires expertise and should be 
performed impartially 
Growth in shareholder value is the only 
important measure of the effectiveness of 
management decisions 
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This comparison illustrates that while the underlying beliefs of NCE do not support the Risk Culture 
practices favored by regulators, these Risk Culture practices are consistent with the ERM beliefs.   
 
That does not mean, however, that NCE and ERM cannot productively co-exist within a firm.  Many 
companies employ pricing strategies and mark-to-market accounting techniques that are consistent 
with NCE alongside risk management practices that are consistent with the ERM principles.  In other 
words, the corporate culture is not monolithic.15 
 
Such an observation, while at odds with much work on corporate culture – which assumes that an 
organization has a single culture – would not surprise anthropologists.  They recognize that culture is 
rarely unitary and never static.  While anthropological Theory of Plural Rationality describes four main 
categories of risk beliefs, real-world organizations typically are hybrids of two or more of these 
categories. 
 
Category Risk Beliefs Preferred Strategy 
Maximizer 
The world tends to stable equilibrium, 
so risk is temporary and unimportant 
Risk Trading: accept well-priced risks (even very large ones) in 
order to maximize profits 
Manager 
Risk is predictable within certain limits 
but dangerous beyond that 
Risk Steering: carefully balance risk and reward within certain 
constraints, using technical expertise  
Conservator 
The world is dangerous and 
equilibrium is precarious 
Loss Controlling: minimize risk, even at the expense of profit, to 
avoid devastating results 
Pragmatist 
The world is inherently unpredictable 
and risk cannot be well understood 
Diversification: keep options open; seek freedom to react to 
changing conditions 
 
Using the framework of Plural Rationality Theory, we see that the underlying beliefs of NCE are 
consistent with the Maximizer view, and the beliefs of ERM are consistent with the Manager view.  
(More information about the Conservator and Pragmatist categories, and indeed a more complete 
discussion of all four categories, can be found in numerous other publications from the authors.16) 
 
To date, our studies of insurer risk beliefs and risk strategy17 show that insurer management typically 
exhibits heterogeneous risk beliefs, and insurers often apply the full range of risk strategies.  Among 
the insurance managers, boards and employees we have assessed, over 50% hold a view consistent with 
NCE, ERM or a blend of the two belief sets; a hybrid NCE/ERM view of risk was more common than 
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either view alone.  In terms of risk strategy, we found that most insurers used at least three and often 
all four of the possible strategies in different contexts.   
 
Insurer annual reports have also given indications of this: 
 
As an insurer, ACE is in the business of risk management for profit. As a result, enterprise risk 
management, or ERM, is a part of the day-to-day management of the Company and its 
operations. Because risk management must permeate an organization conducting insurance 
businesses around the world, we have established an ERM process that is integrated into 
management of our businesses and is led by ACE’s senior management. (2010 Annual Report) 
In the reinsurance industry, the core of the business model is the assumption and 
management of risk. A key challenge is to create total shareholder value through the 
intelligent and optimal assumption and management of reinsurance and investment risks 
while limiting and mitigating those risks that can destroy tangible as well as intangible value, 
those risks for which the organization is not sufficiently compensated, and those risks that 
could threaten the ability of the Company to achieve its objectives. While many companies 
start with a return goal and then attempt to shed risks that may derail that goal, the Company 
starts with a capital-based risk appetite and then looks for risks that meet its return targets 
within that framework. Management believes that this construct allows the Company to 
balance the cedants’ need for certainty of claims payment with the shareholders’ need for an 
adequate total return. (PartnerRe 2013) 
We believe that our risk management tools support our strategy of pursuing opportunities 
created by dislocated markets and help us to identify opportunities that we believe to be the 
most attractive.  (Renaissance Re – 2010 Annual Report) 
Through risk identification, risk evaluation and risk mitigation, we strive for a balance 
between risk and return which ultimately contributes to the sustainable growth and 
development of the Group. (Ping An 2013 Annual Report) 
Anthropologists’ work using the Theory of Plural Rationality to study human interactions reveals that 
heterogeneity, contention, and ongoing change are to be expected; more than that, they are healthy 
and desirable.  In this light it seems reasonable to question whether the regulators’ approach – 
recommending certain practices aligned with one belief set, but not actually addressing those beliefs or 
alternative sets of beliefs – is likely to have the desired impact on Risk Culture. 
 
What is risk? 
Before going further, let us first acknowledge that anything to do with Risk Culture must – 
fundamentally – deal with human beings and the way groups of human beings interact with one 
another.  We have examined what “culture” means; it seems appropriate to examine the nature of 
“risk” in this context as well.   
 
More than 40 years ago, two seminal papers on risk were published: Chauncey Starr’s “Social Benefit 
versus Technological Risk” and Mary Douglas’s “Environments at Risk.”  Chauncey Starr was an 
engineer at the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto, California; Mary Douglas was a social 
anthropologist at University College London. 
  
  
 
Starr Douglas 
Insisted on the fundamental distinction between 
objective risk (what the risk really is) and perceived 
risk (what people variously and erroneously believe it 
to be). 
i.e. 
 Risk is "out there" 
 Risk is essentially a technical matter 
 Risk can be handled using the methods of DMUU 
(Decision Making Under Uncertainty) 
Argued that there is often no valid way of drawing that distinction: we 
can't even talk about risks without perceiving them!  To claim a risk is 
objective is simply to claim that your perceived risk is right and the 
others are wrong. 
i.e. 
 Risk is socially constructed 
 Risk, of its essence, is political 
 Risk can be handled using the methods of DMUCC (Decision 
Making Under Contradictory Certainties) 
 
For the ensuing quarter-century, the Royal Society in the U.K. and the National Academy of Science in 
the U.S. held to Starr’s distinction between objective and perceived risk.  But the issues Douglas had 
raised continued to surface until – in the wake of food safety issues such as mad cow disease – there 
developed a growing consensus that public perceptions must be included in the assessment of risk. 
 
In 1997, Derek Burke (former Vice-Chancellor of the University of East Anglia, and Chairman of the 
U.K. Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes) explained the paradigm shift.  Initially he 
had believed that all “experts” had to do was decide whether a novel food or process was safe, and then 
a grateful public would accept it.  But over time he came to see scientific expertise as feeding into a 
political process – one that involved not just scientists, but also consumers and their various 
perceptions of risk.  The scientists’ failure to appreciate the essentially political nature of what they 
were doing had led to their being seen (in Burke’s words) as “arrogant, distant and uncaring.”  In other 
words, insistence on a technical definition of objective risk – and disregard for the heterogeneous 
cultural context – simply did not have the intended effect. 
 
  
Implications for Risk Culture 
The recent FSB publication on Risk Culture1 asserts: 
 
 
A sound risk culture should emphasise throughout the institution the importance of ensuring 
that: (i) an appropriate risk-reward balance consistent with the institution’s risk appetite is 
achieved when taking on risks; (ii) an effective system of controls commensurate with the 
scale and complexity of the financial institution is properly put in place; (iii) the quality of 
risk models, data accuracy, capability of available tools to accurately measure risks, and 
justifications for risk taking can be challenged, and (iv) all limit breaches, deviations from 
established policies, and operational incidents are thoroughly followed up with 
proportionate disciplinary actions when necessary. 
 
While this example is taken from the FSB, it is reasonably representative of the approach of other 
regulatory and quasi-regulatory bodies.  Fundamentally, the idea is to impose practices that are highly 
consistent with pure ERM beliefs on all financial institutions, regardless of the firms’ actual underlying 
beliefs. 
 
For firms whose culture is already strongly or solely driven by the ERM beliefs (our studies to date 
suggest this is a minority), there is no problem; the recommended practices may already be in place, 
and any that need to be added or strengthened should fit well with the existing culture.  But for other 
firms, the three possible outcomes would seem to be: 
1. Exposure to regulators’ recommended practices will cause a shift in the firm’s underlying 
beliefs 
2. Conflict of underlying beliefs will result in the firm rejecting regulators’ recommended 
practices  
3. Conflict of underlying beliefs will result in the firm performing “Potemkin ERM,” i.e. going 
through the motions of the recommended practices without accepting the underlying ERM 
beliefs, and therefore without any meaningful reliance on those practices 
 
There are few recorded instances of major changes to culture resulting from declarations (the first 
possibility above).  More often, cultural change arises from endogenous institutional dynamics or 
comes about after a “surprise” – an instance in which the organization experiences a drastic deviation 
from its expectations or from the experience of other similar organizations.  Shein3 suggests that a 
culture will change only when it perceives that the pain of not changing exceeds the pain of changing.  
A mandate – even from so important a body as a regulator or rating agency – may not be able to 
summon sufficient force of pain to change underlying beliefs, especially when Potemkin ERM is an 
option. 
 
Culture develops as an organization successfully navigates its formational challenges.  A firm’s culture 
is a combination of the values, beliefs, and practices that led the organization to success.  Typically 
there are many factors – and so the firm’s culture is unlikely to be monolithic.  Similarly, the risk 
lessons learned by different groups within the firm are likely to vary, leading to varying perspectives on 
risk. 
 
Without consideration of the differing perspectives held by the various stakeholders in financial 
transactions, prescriptions for financial risk management and Risk Culture face an uphill battle for 
meaningful adoption.  No matter how strong the expert consensus regarding the probabilities and 
associated impacts of possible future outcomes, risk entails human and political dimensions that 
technocrats neglect at the peril of finding their recommendations rejected, ignored or given mere lip 
service.  For this reason we believe that a truly useful description of healthy Risk Culture must respect 
not only the heterogeneous nature of culture but also the plural perspectives on risk. 
 
The good news is that such a multifaceted framework for Risk Culture is quite achievable – and indeed 
likely to yield more robust results than any monoculture.  As we have set out in other writings18 , hybrid 
Risk Cultures can draw from the strengths of various perspectives to yield a result that is not only more 
meaningful and better accepted – because it aligns with underlying belief sets – but also more resilient 
in an ever-changing world.   
 
The resilience of a hybrid culture is not, however, achieved by simply importing an ERM subculture 
into a NCE culture.  It is achieved by developing a blended belief system that incorporates elements of 
the beliefs of NCE with the ERM beliefs into the dominant culture of the organization.  These beliefs 
will then support the adoption of some version (though not necessarily the version espoused by the 
regulators) of the ten risk culture practices.   
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